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INTRODUCTION
In 1998, the Human Rights Campaign ("HRC"), the nation's largest
gay and lesbian civil rights organization, caused a national controversy with
its decision to endorse then-United States Senator Alfonse D'Amato, a
Republican from New York state, in his re-election bid.' Many individuals
voiced opposition to the endorsement, citing the generally more hostile
attitudes toward gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender equality among
Republicans and D'Amato's own conservative politics, including his
* Assistant Professor, Southern Methodist University School of Law. B.A.,
University of Pennsylvania; J.D., Yale Law School. I would like to thank the students on
the Michigan Journal of Race & Law for sponsoring this Symposium and for inviting me to
attend. I also extend my gratitude to the other participants in the Symposium for their
comments on my presentation. I am particularly grateful to Kathryn Abrams and Sylvia
Lazos for their helpful engagement with my scholarship.
1. See Edward Walsh, Gay Rights Group Stirs Flap With D'Amato Nod, WASH. POST,
Oct. 23, 1998, at A13.
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2opposition to abortion rights. Responding to widespread criticism of its
selection, HRC distributed an "Open Letter" to its "Members and
Friends" that sought to explain and defend the organization's endorse-
ment.3 The Open Letter states that HRC endorsed over two hundred
candidates in 1998 congressional elections and that the majority of those
endorsements supported Democratic candidates.4 The Open Letter, nev-
ertheless, explains that "a growing number of Republicans are also
represented among those we have named as preferred candidates."' The
Open Letter further states that HRC takes two primary factors into
consideration in each endorsement decision: a preference for pro-gay and
lesbian incumbents and a commitment to supporting only one candidate in
each race, despite a rival's positive record on gay and lesbian equality.6
The Open Letter then describes HRC's perception of D'Amato's
support for gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender people7 and argues that
2. See id.; see also James Dao, Democrats Try to Talk Gay Group Out of Backing
D'Amato, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1998, at 37.
3. See Open Letter "Regarding the New York Senate Race" from Elizabeth Birch,
Executive Director, Human Rights Campaign, to Members and Friends of the Human
Rights Campaign (Oct. 20, 1998) (on file with the Michigan Journal of Race & Law).
4. Id. at 1.
5. Id.
6. Id. The Open Letter states:
The process by which our endorsements are made is rigorous, but two
aspects in particular, incumbent preference and single-candidate en-
dorsements, are worth special note.
First, where an incumbent in office has worked consistently on behalf
of gay and lesbian Americans, even if a rival's record is also excellent,
we reward the incumbent for supporting the cause of gay and lesbian
equality while in that office.
Second, because a dual endorsement does not direct voters toward a
single candidate, we select one candidate in each race even when the
record and official position of more than one candidate is exemplary.
Id.
7. According to the Open Letter,
[S]enator D'Amato has improved his record significantly. He has helped
secure critical increases in HIV and AIDS funding, has cosponsored the
Hate Crimes Prevention Act and has both cosponsored and worked on
behalf of the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA). He has
been with us on other critical votes as well. In short, his record is among
one of the best in the United States Senate at this time.
Five years ago, while other Republicans (and Democrats) stood silent on
the issue of gays and lesbians serving openly in the U.S. military, Senator
D'Amato broke with his party's leadership to vigorously support such
service. This year, as the nomination of Jim Hormel languished under
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"fairness" compels the organization's support of D'Amato over his rival,
and ultimate victor, Democratic candidate Charles Schumer.s Specifi-
cally, the Open Letter states that while Schumer has an "excellent
record" on gay and lesbian equality, the organization must consistently
apply its endorsement principles that favor pro-gay incumbents and sin-
gle-candidate endorsements.9 The Open Letter explains that
as an organization, HRC cannot seek fairness in civil soci-
ety unless it is also willing to model fairness in its own
behaviors. And this endorsement resulted from an applica-
tion of the same rules that have been applied before, in less
strident campaigns and less unsettled times, with an absolute
devotion to fairness. 10
HRC undoubtedly drafted the Open Letter as a public relations
measure intended to quell the anger of progressive activists and of donors
to and members of the organization who disagreed with its decision."
But the Open Letter represents much more than this, for it is also at the
center of an ongoing conflict over the direction of identity politics:
whether essentialist and single-issue commitments should continue to
dominate social equality movements or whether these movements must
begin to embrace a more multidimensional understanding of subordina-
tion and discrimination and engage in the difficult work needed to form
political coalitions across social movements and across individual and
group identities. HRC's Open Letter places the organization squarely
within the essentialist status quo of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender
politics.
HRC's endorsement of D'Amato is essentialist (as well as racist,
sexist, and classist) because it defines gay and lesbian politics in white,
upper-class, and male terms. The organization endorsed D'Amato despite
his utter lack of support among persons of color, feminists, and even the
larger population of gays and lesbians (who are not, of course, completely
separate communities). 2 These communities undoubtedly withheld their
Trent Lott's benign neglect, Senator D'Amato challenged his party's
leadership by championing a fair hearing and approval process.
Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
8. Id. at 1-2.
9. Id. at 2.
10. Id. at 1-2.
11. At least one member of HRC's Board of Directors resigned in protest. See
Walsh, supra note 1.
12. D'Amato's challenger, Charles Schumer received votes from 59% of female
voters, 86% of black voters, and 82% of Latino voters. Kevin Flynn, Schumer Showed
Strength Across the State, Even in Some of D'Amato's Strongholds, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1998,
at B15. A separate report indicates that 80% of gay and lesbian voters selected Schumer.
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support from D'Amato due to his political positions disfavoring the poor,
women, and persons of color; they also opposed the broader racism,
sexism and homophobia within the Republican party. HRC, neverthe-
less, overlooked these critical issues and selected D'Amato over Schumer
because D'Amato cast scattered votes for "gay" issues. Thus, HRC's
position placed gay and lesbian equality in tension with racial, class, and
gender justice. The organization concluded that D'Amato had a positive
record on gay and lesbian equality, despite his negative attitudes on race,
gender, and class equity and his unfavorable status among women, per-
sons of color, and progressive gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender
people. HRC's vision of gay and lesbian equality required gay men of
color and lesbians of all races to silence central parts of their identities and
political commitments in order to embrace a narrowly defined gay and
lesbian "equality., 13 White, upper-class male constituents of HRC did
not have to make such complicated choices. Thus, while HRC at-
tempted to defend its decision on "fairness" grounds, the organization's
vision of fairness and equality stands upon racial, class, and gender privi-
leges.
1 4
The HRC endorsement controversy reflects broader, structural
problems in antisubordination theory: the embrace of essentialist politics,
the positioning of progressive movements as oppositional and conflicting
forces, rather than as potential alliances and coalitions, and the failure to
recognize the multidimensional and complex nature of subordination. 5
Douglas Turner, Schumer Puts Big Dent in State GOP Machine Built By D'Amato, BUFFALO
NEWS, Nov. 4, 1998, at 8A.
13. The late Audre Lorde observed, in an oft-quoted passage:
As a Black lesbian feminist comfortable with the many different ingredi-
ents of my identity, and a woman committed to racial and sexual
freedom from oppression, I find I am constantly being encouraged to
pluck out some one aspect of myself and present this as the meaningful
whole, eclipsing or denying the other parts of self. But this is a destruc-
tive and fragmenting way to live.
AUDRE LORDE, Age, Race, Class, and Sex: Women Redefining Difference, in SISTER OUTSIDER:
ESSAYS AND SPEECHES 114, 120 (1984).
14. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and
Lesbian Legal Theory and Political Discourse, 29 CONN. L. REV. 561, 621-22 (1997)
[hereinafter Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen] ("Although [essentialist white gay male activists]
contend that race, class, and gender detract-or are separate-from gay politics, the
political vision they prescribe rests firmly upon racial, class, and gender privilege.").
15. For a survey of literature on the problem of essentialism in progressive theory,
see BELL HOOKS, AIN'T I A WOMAN? BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM (1981); Kimberle
Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against
Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Ignoring the
Sexualization of Race: Heteronormativity, Critical Race Theory, and Anti-Racist Politics, 47
BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1999) [hereinafter Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race];
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While essentialism remains a prominent feature of progressive social
movements, critical scholars have offered persuasive arguments against
traditional, single-issue politics and have proposed reforms in a variety of
doctrinal and policy contexts. 16 The feminist of color critiques of femi-
nism and antiracism provided the earliest framework for analyzing
oppression in complex terms. Feminists of color and other critical schol-
ars have examined racism and patriarchy as "intersecting" phenomena,
rather than as separate and mutually exclusive systems of domination. 7
Their work on the intersectionality of subordination has encouraged
some judges and progressive scholars to discard the "separate spheres"
analysis of race and gender. 8 The powerful intersectionality model has
also inspired many other avenues of critical engagement. Lesbian-feminist
theorists, for example, have challenged the patriarchy and heterosexism
of law and sexuality and feminist theorists, respectively,' 9 and, recently, a
growing intellectual movement has emerged that responds to racism
within gay and lesbian circles and heterosexism within antiracist activ-
ism. 20 These "post-intersectionality" scholars are collectively pushing
Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen, supra note 14; Mar J. Matsuda, Beside My Sister, Facing the
Enemy: Legal Theory Out of Coalition, 43 STAN. L. R.EV. 1183 (1991).
16. See sources cited supra note 15.
17. See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 15 (developing and employing "intersectionality"
to analyze domestic violence policies); Judith A Winston, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: Title
VII, Section 1981, and the Intersection of Race and Gender in the Civil Rights Act of 1990, 79
CAL. L. R-Ev. 775 (1991) (discussing the intersection of race and gender in employment
law).
18. See Lam v. University of Hawai'i, 40 F.3d 1551, 1562 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[W]here
two bases for discrimination exist, they cannot be neatly reduced to distinct components.
Rather than aiding the decisional process, the attempt to bisect a person's identity at the
intersection of race and gender often distorts or ignores the particular nature of their
experiences.") (citations omitted).
19. For discussions on conflicts between lesbians and gay men within the context of
"gay" politics see MARTIN DUBERMAN, STONEWALL 247-50 (1993); Patricia A. Cain,
Lesbian Perspective, Lesbian Experience, and the Risk of Essentialism, 2 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L.
43, 60 (1994) (citing Charlotte Bunch, Not for Lesbians Only, in BUILDING FEMINIST
THEORY: ESSAYS FROM QUEST 67, 68 (1981)); Steven Seidman, Identity and Politics in a
"Postmodern" Gay Culture: Some Historical and Conceptual Notes, in FEAR OF A QUEER
PLANET: QUEER POLITICS AND SOCIAL THEORY 105, 111-27 (Michael Warner ed., 1993).
For discussions on the conflicts between lesbians and heterosexual women within the
context of feminist theory see SHEILA JEFFREYS, THE SPINSTER AND HER ENEMIES: FEMI-
NISM AND SEXUALITY 1880-1930 (1985); LESBIANISM AND THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT
(Nancy Myron & Charlotte Bunch eds., 1975); DEL MARTIN & PHYLLIS LYON, LES-
BIAN/WOMAN 274-76 (1972); Mary Eaton, At the Intersection of Gender and Sexual
Orientation: Toward Lesbian Jurisprudence, 3 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 183, 187-
88 (1994).
20. See Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen, supra note 14, at 563-64 n.12 (listing numerous
works on race and sexual identity); see also Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race,
supra note 15, at 4 n.12 (same).
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jurists and progressive theorists to examine forms of subordination as
interrelated, rather than conflicting, phenomena.
This Article arises out of the intersectionality and post-
intersectionality literature and makes a case against the essentialist
considerations that informed HRC's endorsement of D'Amato. Part I
discusses the pitfalls that occur when scholars and activists engage in
essentialist politics and treat identities and forms of subordination as
conflicting forces. Part II examines how essentialism negatively affects
legal theory in the equality context. Part III considers the historical
motivation for and the efficacy of the "intersectionality" response to the
problem of essentialism. Part III also extensively analyzes the
"multidimensional" critiques of essentialism offered by the most recent
school of thought in this area-the race-sexuality critics of law and
sexuality and critical race theory. Finally, Part III examines the
conceptual and substantive distinctions between multidimensionality (and
other post-intersectionality theories) and intersectionality and offers
suggestions for future theorizing in anti-subordination jurisprudence.
I. CONFLICTING IDENTITIES AND MOVEMENTS
A. The Politics of Essentialism
Although activists and scholars have vigorously challenged the es-
sentialist nature of contemporary identity politics and equality theory,
progressive movements invariably remain singular in their focus. Internal
critics within feminism, antiracism, gay and lesbian rights, and other
progressive movements have endeavored to broaden the scope of these
movements so that they can adequately address the complex sources of
inequality that their constituent populations endure. 21 The impact of the
internal, anti-essentialist critiques has been limited, however, and these
movements remain centered around the experiences of individuals with
relative privilege. 22 As the internal critiques reveal, essentialism in pro-
gressive movements does not result merely from a lack of "data" on the
particularity of identity and the multiplicity of subordination, but from
the embrace of racial, class, gender, and sexuality hierarchies by
"dominant" classes within these movements.23 For example, racial, class
21. See, e.g., Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Beyond the Rhetoric of Dirty Laundry: Exam-
ining the Value of Internal Criticism within Progressive Social Movements and Oppressed
Communities, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 185 (1999) [hereinafter Hutchinson, Beyond the
Rhetoric].
22. See id. at 188-91.
23. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARv. L. Rav. 829, 874
(1990) ("A theory that purports to isolate gender as a basis for oppression ... reinforces
other forms of oppression."); Trina Grillo & Stephanie Wildman, Obscuring the Importance
[VOL. 6:285
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and gender privileges inform the absence of attention to "material" or
"substantive" equality in most gay political agendas. These agendas de-
mand, almost exclusively, formal equality. 24 While the achievement of
formal equality will likely enhance the status of all gays and lesbians,
persons who suffer from structural barriers to societal resources, such as
poverty and institutionalized racism and sexism, will need deeper legal
and policy reforms that address these conditions.2 s By ignoring the impact
of racism, sexism, and poverty upon gay men and lesbians, gay and les-
bian rights organizations reflect the racial, gender, and class privileges of
the individuals who shape and direct their institutional endeavors.
When progressive theorists and activists resist implementing multi-
dimensional agendas, they often create conflict among the various
movements for social justice. As the controversy surrounding HRC's
endorsement of Senator D'Amato illustrates, gay and lesbian essentialism
leads to tension among anti-heterosexist, antiracist, and feminist scholars
and activists. Acceptance of HRC's view of gay and lesbian equality, for
example, required a silencing of progressive racial, gender and class poli-
tics.
The pursuit of same-sex marriage, a formal equality goal, has created
similar conflicts within the gay rights community. As I have previously
observed, lesbian-feminists have voiced their strong opposition to or
skepticism of the pursuit of same-sex marriage because marriage has
historically facilitated the domination of women by men.2 6 Racial critics
have also challenged the primacy given to marriage in gay and lesbian
politics because the marriage movement lends credibility to a harmful
discourse that stigmatizes the non-nuclear family arrangements in poor
communities of color.2' Furthermore, extensive sociological data have
demonstrated that marriage supplies very little, if any, economic benefits
of Race: The Implication of Making Comparisons Between Racism and Sexism (Or Other -Isms),
1991 DUKE LJ. 397, 401 (arguing that feminist theory, when comparing racism to sex-
ism, "perpetuates patterns of racial domination" by, among other things, centralizing
"white issues" and "rendering women of color invisible"); Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen,
supra note 14, at 637 ("[B]y marginalizing issues of race and class, gay and lesbian essen-
tialism replicates patterns of social exclusion-racism, sexism, economic oppression,
people of color, women, and the poor remain irrelevant.").
24. Darren Lenard Hutchinson, "Gay Rights" for "Gay Whites"?: Race, Sexual Iden-
tity, and Equal Protection Discourse, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 1358, 1369 (2000) [hereinafter,
Hutchinson, Gay Rights for Gay Whites] (criticizing lack of material element in main-
stream gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender political and legal agendas).
25. Id. at 1370.
26. See, e.g., Paula Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, in LESBIANS,
GAY MEN, AND THE LAw 401 (William B. Rubenstein ed., 1993); Nancy D. Polikoff,
We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not
"Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage", 79 VA. L. REV. 1535 (1993).
27. See Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen, supra note 14, at 592-93; Hutchinson, Gay
Rights for Gay Whites, supra note 24, at 1370-72.
identity Crisis
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
to extremely poor individuals. 2' Due to these economic and cultural
patterns, heterosexuals of color marry in lower rates than whites. 29 By
decreeing legal marriage "the most important" goal for gay and lesbian
politics, 3 scholars and activists obscure racial, class, and gender distinc-
tions among gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and transgender people, construct
gay and lesbian political agendas upon gender, class, and racial hierar-
chies, and create conflict among antiracist, feminist, anti-heterosexist, and
antipoverty activists and scholars.31
Disputes between gay and lesbian activists and antiracists over the
"relative" value of anti-heterosexism and antiracism provide some of the
more contentious conflicts around race and sexuality. Advocates of sexual
equality invite these disputes with their frequent analogies of race and
racism to sexual identity and heterosexism. Proponents of the race-
sexuality analogies hope to create empathy for gay and lesbian equality
efforts and to place anti-heterosexism within the constitutional and
statutory civil rights frameworks that evolve from a history of racial sub-
ordination.32 Because heterosexism is as socially harmful as racism,
according to the analogies, civil rights law should strictly scrutinize pri-
• - 33
vate and governmental discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.S • 34
The race-sexuality analogies are blatantly essentialist. The analogies
blur the differences within the population of gays, lesbians, bisexuals and
transgender people by treating this population as separate from people of
28. See Lisa Catanzarite & Vilma Ortiz, Family Matters, Work Matters?: Poverty Among
Women of Color and White Women, in RACE, CLASS, AND GENDER: AN ANTHOLOGY 149-
60 (Margaret L. Andersen & Patricia Hill Collins eds., 1998) (arguing that poverty re-
duces the economic attractiveness of marriage); Hutchinson, Gay Rights for Gay Whites,
supra note 24, at 1370-72 (discussing racial and class implications of marriage).
29. See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 63-92 (1987); WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK
DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR 101-04 (1996); Catanzarite & Ortiz,
supra note 28, at 149-160.
30. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL
LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 8 (1996) ("Marriage is the most important right the
state has to offer ....").
31. See Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen, supra note 14, at 585-602.
32. See, e.g., Janet E. Halley, Gay Rights and Identity Imitation: Issues in the Ethics of
Representation, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 115, 121 (David Kairys
ed., 1988). Halley argues that "gay and lesbian advocates often find themselves saying that
sexual orientation is like race, or that gay men and lesbians are like a racial group, or that
anti-gay policies are like racist policies, or that homophobia is like racism." Id. at 121; see
also Sharon Elizabeth Rush, Equal Protection Analogies-Identity and "Passing": Race and
Sexual Orientation, 13 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 65, 76 (1997) ("At present ... advocates
for gay men and lesbians who attempt to secure heightened scrutiny for sexual orientation
discrimination cases are pursuing both possibilities of comparing sexual orientation to sex
and race.").
33. See Rush, supra note 32, at 76.
34. See Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen, supra note 14, at 631-34.
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color, and they ignore the differences across the population of marginal-
ized groups by purporting to equate the experiences of the racially
subordinate and victims of heterosexism.3s
Many antiracist scholars and persons of color have rejected the
analogies; their responses arise out of both homophobia36 and antiessen-
tialism.37 Some of the reactions to the race-sexuality analogies by persons
of color are homophobic because they trivialize the harmful impact of
heterosexist subordination and, after purporting to find no parallels be-
tween racism and heterosexism, completely discount the social value of a
pro-gay civil rights structure. Colin Powell, for example, defends the
military's anti-gay discrimination on the ground that race, unlike sexualS • 38
identity, is a "benign" characteristic. Even some critical race theorists
have questioned the legitimacy of including sexual identity as a protected
category in civil rights statutes and doctrine; their arguments often make
light of or question the subordination that gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and
transgender people endure.39
While some of the person of color responses to the race-sexuality
analogies evolve out of homophobia, many of the responses rightfully
criticize gay and lesbian essentialism. The critics of the analogies have
accurately revealed how the analogies hide the pervasiveness of racial and
class oppression. When white gays and lesbians claim that they are
similarly situated with persons of color, they mask the operation of white
35. See id.; see alsoJane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the States: Decoding the
Discourse of Equivalents, 29 HAxv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rav. 283, 297 (1994) (arguing that race-
sexuality analogies "erase[ ] 'vertical' differences within a group ... [and] 'horizontal' differ-
ences across the spectrum of legally protected groups"). See also Grillo & Wildman, supra
note 23, at 401 ("Comparing sexism to racism perpetuates patterns of racial domination by
marginalizing and obscuring the different roles that race plays in the lives of people of color
and of whites.").
36. See URVASHI VAID, VIRTUAL EQUALITY: THE MAINSTREAMING OF GAY AND
LESBIAN LIBERATION 187 (1995) ("[S]ome of the [black community's] anger at the analo-
gies stems from homophobia .... "); Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen, supra note 14, at 628
(arguing that black responses to the race-sexuality analogies may "flow from a disappro-
bation of homosexuality and an opposition to gay and lesbian rights").
37. See VAID, supra note 36, at 187 ("To a large extent, black resentment at our use
of the racial analogy arises from the persistence of racism, despite the best efforts of a
seasoned movement to eradicate it."); Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen, supra note 14, at 627
("A review of the black responses [to the race-sexuality analogies] reveals that blacks are
troubled that white gays, by comparing their experiences with discrimination to those of
blacks, trivialize the impact of racial subordination and privilege in the lives of blacks and
white gays.") (emphasis in original).
38. Lynne Duke, Drawing Parallels-Gays and Blacks: Linking Military Ban to Integration
Fight Stirs Outrage, Sympathy, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1993, at Al ("Homosexuality is not a
benign ... characteristic such as skin color .... It goes to one of the most fundamental
aspects of human behavior.") (quoting Colin Powell).
39. See generally Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race, supra note 15
(discussing the marginalization of gays and lesbians within critical race theory).
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and upper-class privilege in their lives. This essentialist distortion of race
and class oppression has caused conflict among persons of color and pro-
gay advocates.40
While the racial critics of the race-sexuality analogies persuasively
challenge gay and lesbian essentialism, their own narrow vision of equal-
ity also fosters conflict between progressive scholars and activists. The
racial critics place race and sexual identity in completely separate spheres.
In their rejection of the race-sexuality analogies, they dismiss any con-
nection between the experiences of persons of color and gays and
lesbians. 41 This pattern reflects a broader marginalization of the impor-
tance of gay and lesbian equality in racial justice efforts; antiracist
movements have commonly excluded progressive gay and lesbian politics
from their agendas.42 The experiences of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and trans-
gender persons of color, however, belie such a fragmented
antisubordination analysis. Heterosexism and racism interact to shape
their subordination in a variety of contexts, including oppressive vio-
lence, public health issues, and employment discrimination. 3 Advocates
of gay and lesbian equality and antiracists, nevertheless, often fail to re-
spond adequately to such incidents of "homophobic racism" due to their
support of essentialism, racism, and heterosexism.44 Because antiracist and
pro-gay activists treat racism and heterosexism as wholly separate phe-
nomena, they withhold their advocacy from incidents of discrimination
and structures of subordination that involve these synergistic forms of
exclusion. 41 When antiracist and pro-gay activists challenge incidents of
homophobic racism, their responses are singular: they focus solely on the
racial or homophobic dimensions of the acts of domination and fail to
46unveil the multidimensional nature of oppression.
40. See sources cited supra note 37.
41. See, e.g., John Sibley Butler, Homosexuals and the Military Establishment, 31 Soci-
ETY 13, 15 (1993) ("[T]he issue of social change relating to homosexuality must be
divorced from issues relating to the history of blacks in America.").
42. See generally Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race, supra note 15.
43. See Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race, supra note 15, at 17-40, 56-57;
Hutchinson, Gay Rights for Gay Whites, supra note 24, at 1375-78.
44. See Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen, supra note 14, at 567-82 (discussing inadequate
response to sexualized racism by gay and lesbian advocacy groups); Hutchinson, Ignoring
the Sexualization of Race, supra note 15, at 56-58 (discussing inadequate response to sexu-
alized racism by antiracists).
45. See sources cited supra note 44.
46. See Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race, supra note 15, at 21-33
(discussing pro-gay and antiracist responses to sexualized racist violence).
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B. The Contradictions of Essentialism
Although progressive theorists often reject multiplicity theories,
their disagreement with theories regarding the complexity of oppression
is selective and contradictory, for the scholarship of essentialist theorists
actually embraces the particularity of experience-but to a limited and
subtle degree: these activists and theorists challenge only the multidi-
mensional subordination experienced by more privileged members of
47
oppressed communities. The legacy of racial subordination, for exam-
ple, is replete with examples of sexualized oppression. Lynching, the
imposition of the death penalty in the context of interracial rape, sexual
harassment, and the rape of women of color are all institutions that in-
volve a potent intersection of racial, gender, and sexuality hierarchies-
colored by white fears and marginalization of the heterosexual practices
of persons of color.4 Antiracist activists and theorists have thoroughly
countered and examined this sexualized oppression, but have declined to
engage in advocacy on behalf of gays and lesbians of color who also
endure sexualized racist oppression. 49 Thus, antiracists have responded to
racism in its "heterosexual" forms, but, driven by essentialism and het-
erosexism, they refuse to recognize and challenge homophobic racism.
Essentialist antiracist theory is, therefore, internally inconsistent. Anti-
racists do not ignore all forms of complex subordination; instead, they
47. See Crenshaw, supra note 15, at 1252 (arguing that the "specific raced and gen-
dered experiences [of men of color and white women], although intersectional, often
define as well as confine the interests of the entire group") (emphasis in original);
Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race, supra note 15, at 12-17, 79-96 (discussing
the multilayered experiences of classes that dominate antisubordination theory).
48. See generally CHARLES HERBERT STEMBER, SEXUAL RACISM: THE EMOTIONAL
BARRIER TO AN INTEGRATED SOCIETY (1976) (discussing "sexualized racism"); Sumi K.
Cho, Converging Stereotypes in Racialized Sexual Harassment: Where the Model Minority Meets
Suzie Wong, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 177 (1997) (analyzing "sexualized racial stereo-
types" and "racialized gender stereotypes"); Stacey Pastel Dougan, With Justice for hom?
The Presumption of Moral Innocence in Rape Trials, 71 IND. L.J. 419, 435-37 (1996)
(discussing "racialized sexual stereotypes"); Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race,
supra note 15, at 79-96 (discussing the "sexualization of race"); see also NAOMI ZACK, The
American Sexualization of Race, in RACE/SEX: THEIR SAMENESS, DIFFERENCE, AND INTER-
PLAY 145 (Naomi Zack ed., 1997) (discussing "sexualization of race"). Zack argues that
[t]he result of the historical intersection or connection between socially
constructed sexuality and socially constructed race has been the sexuali-
zation of race in American lived experience .... The sexualization of
race means that the fictitious ideological machinery which posits and re-
produces the existence of races . . . as well as the crimes and slights that
whites have committed, and still do commit, against blacks in American
culture ... are qualities and conditions of sexuality, for some individuals.
ZACK, supra, at 147.
49. See Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race, supra note 15, at 96-97.
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reserve their advocacy and theorizing for more "dominant" members of
oppressed communities, such as heterosexual men of color. Because they
rest their advocacy and theories on gender and sexuality hierarchies,
essentialist antiracist theorists undermine the central goal of progressive
legal advocacy-the eradication of social oppression. s°
Gay and lesbian essentialism is similarly contradictory. While gay
and lesbian theorists have explicitly and implicitly embraced essentialist
analyses, their theories are, nevertheless, informed by interwoven racial,
class, and gender hierarchies." The gay rights' dismissal of lesbian-
feminist and racial critiques of same-sex marriage, for example, produces
an analysis grounded upon the experiences of white and upper-class gays
and lesbians.12 Several white, upper-class, male theorists, for example,
contend that same-sex marriage is the "most important" right for gays
and lesbians. Seemingly unmoved 4 by the concerns of women and
persons of color who challenge the racial, socio-economic, and sexual
hegemony of marriage, these theorists place tremendous importance on
an "equality" goal that will distribute its benefits along racial, class, and
gender lines. Their advocacy responds to the positionality of white, up-
per-class, and male individuals. Thus, the "absence" of attention to race,
class, and gender hierarchies within law and sexuality scholarship simply
reinforces, as critical race and feminist theorists have observed, invisible
social norms of whiteness, maleness, and class privilege.5
50. See id. at 97 ("Heteronormativity in anti-racist discourse ... compounds the
marginalization of gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgendered people of color, who already
face racial, class, gender and heterosexist oppression from the greater society.").
51. See Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen, supra note 14, at 621 (observing that gay and
lesbian essentialism reinforces racial, class, and gender hierarchies).
52. See id. at 585-602 (unveiling racial, class, and gender assumptions of same-sex
marriage proponents); Hutchinson, Gay Rights for Gay Whites, supra note 24, at 1370-72
(same); Ettelbrick, supra note 26, at 403-04 (same).
53. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 30, at 8.
54. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REv.
1419, 1493 (1993). Professor Eskridge acknowledges the lesbian feminist critiques of
same-sex but concludes that
[t]he gay man is less likely to commit himself to gender and race dis-
crimination issues than is the lesbian or the person of color, again
whether or not he can get married. The gay man is already more likely
to be an insider. Allowing him to marry another man will not change
that.
Id. Eskridge does not consider whether same-sex marriage will reinforce the "gay man's"
insider status or whether this "gay man" is likely white. See Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen,
supra note 14, at 600 (criticizing Eskridge's analysis).
55. Critical scholars have examined the "transparent" nature of whiteness and male-
ness. For a discussion of white transparency, see HARLON L. DALTON, RACIAL HEALING:
CONFRONTING THE FEAR BETWEEN BLACKS AND WHITES 109 (1995) ("For most Whites,
race-or more precisely, their own race-is simply part of the unseen, unproblematic
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The failure of gay and lesbian equality theorists to examine racial hi-
erarchy is particularly disturbing in light of the ways in which opponents
of gay rights exploit race to contest the legitimacy of progressive sexual
politics. Anti-gay activists describe legal proscriptions of sexual orienta-
tion discrimination as "special rights. ' ' 16 These rights are purportedly
"special" because gays and lesbians, according to the misleading rhetoric,
possess disproportionate amounts of political power, wealth, and educa-
tion (unlike persons of color), and their privileged status does not
warrant the protection of civil rights structures.17 As I have previously
observed, the "special rights" rhetoric racializes gays and lesbians as a
white and wealthy class, who are not harmed by any discrimination they
face. 8 Although the racialized "special rights" rhetoric is a common and
dangerous response to gay and lesbian rights efforts, the essentialist nature
of gay and lesbian theory does not permit an adequate countering of this
discourse. Because the poor, persons of color, and issues of racial subju-
gation and poverty are marginalized within gay and lesbian theory,
political organizations, and communities, pro-gay advocacy may actually
affinn the perception of gay privilege; the invisibility of these populations
and issues simply reinforces and helps to construct the pervasive, yet
59incorrect, wealthy gay stereotype.
Progressive social movements suffer from their singular, essentialist
focus. When progressive theorists do not acknowledge the relationships
between various forms of subordination, they place progressive move-
ments in tension with one another. Essentialism also forces individuals
who suffer from multiple forms of subordination to silence portions of
background."); Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind but Now I See": Mhite Race Consciousness and
the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 957 (1993) (examining the
"transparency phenomenon[, i.e.] the tendency of whites not to think about whiteness,
or about norms, behaviors, experiences, or perspectives that are white-specific"). For a
discussion of maleness as a hidden norm, see Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register:
The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in Police Interrogation, 103 YALE L.J. 259, 316-17 (1993)
("[T]he law's incorporation of a male normative standard may be invisible but it is not
inconsequential.") (footnote omitted); Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in
Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. R.Ev. 886,
888 (1989) ("The body of law about gender discrimination is wilely understood to
involve 'women's issues'-thus reinforcing the understanding that 'man' is a genderless,
standard creature who does not have to concern himself with gender issues.").
56. Schacter, supra note 35, at 293 ("'Special rights' has become the central slogan
for the anti-gay movement, appearing regularly in the names of organizations opposing
gay civil rights and in their media campaigns.").
57. Id. at 291-93.
58. See Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race, supra note 15, at 70-74;
Hutchinson, Gay Rights for Gay Whites, supra note 24, at 1372-75.
59. See Hutchinson, Gay Rights for Gay Whites, supra note 24, at 1368-72 (discussing
role of gay and lesbian essentialism in perpetuating notion that gays and lesbians are
wealthy, privileged, and white).
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their identity in order to embrace a limited and narrow vision of equal-
ity. These pitfalls do not affect only theory and activism. Instead, legal
analysis, as Part 1I discusses, employs a similarly fragmented and artificial
approach to subordination, an approach that defeats efforts to expand
social equality.
II. CRIsIS IN LAW
A. The Comparative Rhetoric of Equality
Equality jurisprudence creates tension between and essentializes op-
pressed social groups. Equal protection analysis in federal courts, for
example, deploys a "comparative" framework that requires groups seek-
ing heightened judicial scrutiny of their claims of discrimination to
demonstrate that they are like existing protected classes-namely persons
of color and women-and that the system of subordination that affects
them operates in the "same" manner as racism and sexism. In the con-
text of gay and lesbian civil rights, this comparative approach has resulted
in a denial of heightened judicial solicitude to oppressed sexual minori-
ties. Applying the suspect class doctrine implicated in footnote four of
Carolene Products,61 courts have invariably concluded that gays and lesbians
do not carry the indicia of suspicion that warrant application of height-
ened judicial scrutiny.62 The courts' analysis typically focuses on the
"immutability" and "political power" components of the representation-
reinforcement rationale.63
In several opinions, for example, courts have denied heightened
scrutiny in cases of discrimination brought by gays and lesbians based on
the notion that sexual orientation, unlike race, is behavioral and chosen,
rather than immutable. In High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security
64Clearing House, the Ninth Circuit justifies its refusal to treat gays and
lesbians as a suspect class on the grounds that "[h]omosexuality is not an
60. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685-86 (1973) (comparing the status
of women to blacks and "aliens" and concluding that sex discrimination warrants height-
ened scrutiny) (plurality opinion); see also Hutchinson, Gay Rights for Gay Whites, supra
note 24, at 1378-82 (discussing the comparative nature of equal protection analysis);
Rush, supra note 32, at 73-77 (same).
61. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
62. See EVAN GERSTMANN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERCLASS: GAYS, LESBIANS, AND
THE FAILURE OF CLASS-BASED EQUAL PROTECTION 60 (1999) ("The appellate courts have
consistently rejected the argument that gays and lesbians are a suspect class .... Every
court that has considered the issue has stated that gays and lesbians simply do not meet
the criteria for a suspect class.").
63. See generally Hutchinson, Gay Rights for Gay Whites, supra note 24, at 1378-82.
64. 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that gays and lesbians do not constitute a
suspect or quasi-suspect class).
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immutable characteristic; it is behavioral and hence is fundamentally
different from traits such as race, gender, or alienage, which define al-
ready existing suspect and quasi-suspect classes., 6' The immutability
framework seeks to compare gays and lesbians with persons of color and
women. This comparative analysis is essentialist because it treats these
• 66
populations as mutually exclusive. Also, like the proponents of the
"special rights" rhetoric, the immutability analysis purportedly searches
for similarities between gays and lesbians and persons of color and be-
cause it can find none, denies heightened scrutiny to the former. A
comparative equality jurisprudence, therefore, invokes racial subjugation
65. Id. at 573. The court's logic suffers in many respects. First, it includes immutabil-
ity in the suspect class doctrine when no Supreme Court opinion has stated that a finding
of immutability is essential in this context. See Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d
1329, 1347 (9th Cir. 1988), withdrawn, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) ("The Supreme
Court has never held that only classes with immutable traits can be deemed suspect.")
(citation omitted); Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique
of the Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REv. 503, 507-10 (1994) (arguing that
"immutability" is not a requirement for suspect class status). In fact, the Court applies
heightened scrutiny to non-marital children and alienage discrimination claims, in which
the traits are mutable. See United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23, 26-27 (1980) (applying
heightened scrutiny to non-marital children discrimination claims); Graham v. Richard-
son, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971) (applying strict scrutiny in case of "alienage"
discrimination). Furthermore, the Court reduces the "behavioral" dimensions of race and
gender in its analysis. Critical race theory and contemporary feminists view race and
gender as "social constructs," rather than biological phenomena. See Ian F. Haney L6pez,
The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Ray. 1, 27-28 (1994) (discussing social fabrication of race). History,
economic forces, and social relations fabricate the meaning of race and gender. See gener-
ally id. Race and gender are aspects of culture, tools of political analysis, and
"performative" and "experiential." See JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND
THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 25 (1990) ("[Glender is always a doing, though not a doing
by a subject who might be said to preexist the deed .... There is no gender identity
behind the expressions of gender; that identity is performatively constituted by the very
'expressions' that are said to be its result."); Robin D. Barnes, Race Consciousness: The
Thematic Content of Racial Distinctiveness in Critical Race Scholarship, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1864, 1864-65 (1990) ("Critical Race Theorists are attempting to integrate their experi-
ential knowledge, drawn firom a shared history as 'other,' with their ongoing struggles to
transform a world deteriorating under the albatross of racial hegemony."). The immuta-
bility doctrine, however, treats race and gender strictly as biological entities. See
Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, How the Garda Cousins Lost Their Accents: Understand-
ing the Language of Title VII Decisions Approving English-Only Rules as the Product of Racial
Dualism, Latino Invisibility, and Legal Indeterminacy, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1347, 1370 (1997)
("[T]he mutable-versus-immutable dichotomy ignores the persuasive argument ... that
even so-called 'immutable' characteristics such as race and sex are social constructs rather
than anthropological or biological facts of life."). The court's analysis also implies a
"slipperiness" and volatility to gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender status, when many
individuals consider their sexual attraction fixed, even if shaped by social and political
forces.
66. See Hutchinson, Gay Rights for Gay Whites, supra note 24, at 1382.
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and persons of color to the detriment of gay and lesbian equality efforts;
race and sexuality are placed in opposition in such an analysis.
Moreover, courts also reject the notion that gays and lesbians lack
political power, a factor in the suspect class doctrine that goes somewhat
to the heart of Carolene Products and process theory rationales for height-
ened scrutiny: it ensures that courts interfere with the legislative arena
only to protect those groups that cannot defeat abusive legislation in the
political process. Several courts have found that gays and lesbians fail this
test.
In High Tech Gays, for example, the court held that
[1]egislatures have addressed and continue to address the dis-
crimination suffered by homosexuals on account of their
sexual orientation through the passage of anti-discrimination
legislation. Thus, homosexuals are not without political
power; they have the ability to and do 'attract the attention
67
of the lawmakers' as evidenced by such legislation.
Furthermore, while the Supreme Court has not decided whether
gays and lesbians are entitled to heightened scrutiny, at least three mem-
bers of the Court-Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and
Thomas-would clearly reject such a claim, and their arguments would
likely rest, in part, on the theory that gays and lesbians are a "politically
powerful" class. In Romer v. Evans,68 Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, dissented from the Court's ruling
that a Colorado constitutional amendment that banned the state from
enacting laws that protected gays, lesbians, and bisexuals from discrimi-
nation failed a rational basis analysis because the amendment was based
on "animus. ' ' 69 Justice Scalia's dissent offers a sociological portrait of gay
and lesbian individuals that questions their need for judicial solicitude
and that deploys the pernicious wealthy gay stereotype. Justice Scalia
reasons that
because those who engage in homosexual conduct tend to
reside in disproportionate numbers in certain communities,
have high disposable income, and, of course, care about
homosexual-rights issues much more ardently than the
public at large, they possess political power much greater
than their numbers, both locally and statewide. Quite un-
derstandably, they devote this political power to achieving
67. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 574 (citation omitted).
68. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
69. Id. at 632.
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not merely a grudging social toleration, but full social ac-
ceptance, of homosexuality. °
Justice Scalia also criticizes the majority for "plac[ing] the prestige of
[the Court] behind the proposition that opposition to homosexuality is as
reprehensible as racial or religious bias.",7' Justice Scalia embraces, in
every respect, the racializing special rights argument because he finds
troubling distinctions between "those who engage in homosexual con-
duct" and persons of color, and he perceives legal protection of gays and
lesbians as a benefit for a "politically powerful" and wealthy social class7 2
Equal protection jurisprudence thus engages in the same essentialism
that plagues progressive theory and activism. Jurists require gays and
lesbians to demonstrate that they are "like" persons of color and women
in order to qualify for heightened judicial scrutiny. Equality doctrine,
therefore, encourages pro-gay activists and legal theorists to utilize the
divisive and essentialist race-sexuality analogies that spark conflict be-
tween persons of color and gay and lesbian communities. Thus,
comparative equality jurisprudence contributes to the tension among
progressive communities and oppressed social groups. Legal essentialism,
as the next section discusses, also fragments the identities of persons who
suffer from multiple forms of subordination. Because equality jurispru-
dence does not always accommodate claims of multidimensional or
intersecting discrimination, courts often fail to provide relief for plaintiffs
in cases involving multiplicitous discrimination.
B. "Either/Or" Antidiscrimination Analysis
Because equality theory does not acknowledge the complex nature
of subordination, courts often require plaintiffs to formulate their claims
of discrimination in an "either/or" fashion, alleging one form of dis-
crimination or another. 3 Furthermore, courts have failed to recognize
that the cumulative effect of multiple forms of discrimination may create
70. Id. at 645-46 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
71. Id. at 636.
72. Id. at 644-51. For an extended discussion of the racial implications of equal
protection jurisprudence in the gay and lesbian rights context, see Hutchinson, Gay
Rights for Gay Whites, supra note 24, at 1378-82. The present discussion in this Article
borrows heavily from my prior observations.
73. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 142-43 (discussing failure of courts to recognize the intersecting
discrimination claims of black women).
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a unique type of victimization that differs in kind from the sum of indi-
vidual acts of discrimination.
74
Kimberl& Williams Crenshaw, in an influential work on the prob-
lem of essentialism in antidiscrimination doctrine, 75 analyzes the doctrinal
treatment of women of color in antidiscrimination cases. Crenshaw finds
that courts have denied relief to women of color because they narrowly
construe civil rights statutes as not providing these plaintiffs with a rem-
edy for any discrimination they endure as women of color-rather than as
women alone or as persons of color alone.76 Crenshaw's analysis demon-
strates that antidiscrimination doctrine imagines the quintessential race
plaintiffs as men of color and the model sex discrimination plaintiffs as
white women.77 The claims of women of color are viewed as presenting
an unprotected "sub-category" or "special class" and as placing civil
rights doctrine on a dangerous slippery slope.7
While some improvement has occurred in the treatment of women
of color in antidiscrimination cases79 (a result of the intersectionality
74. See id. at 140 (arguing that "the intersectional experience is greater than the sum
of racism and sexism").
75. See id.
76. Id. at 142. Crenshaw argues that the
refusal ... to acknowledge that Black women encounter combined race
and sex discrimination implies that the boundaries of sex and race dis-
crmination doctrine are defined respectively by white women's and
Black men's experiences. Under this view, Black women are protected
only to the extent that their experiences coincide with those of either of
the two groups.
Id. at 142-43.
77. See id. at 151 (arguing that the "paradigm of sex discrimination tends to be based
on the experiences of white women [and that] the model of race discrimination tends to
be based on the experiences of the most privileged Blacks").
78. See, e.g., Degraffenreid v. General Motors Assembly Div., 413 F. Supp. 142, 145
(E.D. Mo. 1976). In Degraffenreid, the court held that
[t]he legislative history surrounding Title VII does not indicate that the
goal of the statute was to create a new classification of 'black women'
who would have greater standing than, for example, a black male. The
prospect of the creation of new classes of protected minorities, governed
only by the mathematical principles of permutation and combination,
clearly raises the prospect of opening the hackneyed Pandora's box.
Id.
79. See, e.g., Lam v. University of Hawai'i, 40 F.3d 1551, 1562 (9th Cit. 1994)
("[Wihere two bases for discrimination exist, they cannot be neatly reduced to distinct
components. Rather than aiding the decisional process, the attempt to bisect a person's
identity at the intersection of race and gender often distorts or ignores the particular
nature of their experiences.") (citing Crenshaw, supra note 73, at 139); Winston, supra
note 17, at 775.
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critique), courts have not even begun to address the problem of essen-
tialism in the context of race/sexuality/gender cases. In these cases,
courts do not recognize "intersecting" discrimination; they have found
that evidence of sexual orientation discrimination negates any possibility
that defendants also engage in racial discrimination; and they have refused
to accept arguments that plaintiffs face unique discrimination as gays and
lesbians of color.s Furthermore, because sexual orientation remains an
unprotected category in federal statutory and constitutional civil rights
law,"' discriminators may willingly concede sexual orientation discrimi-
nation when some evidence of discriminatory action exists, but deny
racial or gender discrimination. The precarious status of sexual orienta-
tion in civil rights law, therefore, allows for the furtherance of racial
subjugation and patriarchy, as defendants package their racism and sexism
in homophobic terms in order to escape liability.
8 3
'84In Peterson v. Bodlovich, for example, the plaintiff-Lawrence Pe-
terson-a black gay male prison inmate, argued that prison officials
violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments when they failed to
house him in an area of the prison that would not complicate his respi-
ratory problems (including asthma and an allergy to cat dander)."'
Peterson claimed that the prison officials refused to house him in an
"open" section of the prison (where he would have had access to fresh
86
air) on account of his race and sexual orientation . Peterson also alleged
that white gays, by contrast, lived in the open dormitory and that a
prison official told him that "'black homosexuals don't adjust right' to
dormitory living."8 A doctor recommended that prison officials change
Peterson's living conditions so that he would not come into contact with
80. Seee.g., infra text accompanying notes 84-101.
81. See Hutchinson, Gay Rights for Gay Whites, supra note 24, at 1358-59 (discussing
statutory and constitutional vulnerability of gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and transgender
people).
82. See, e.g., Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race, supra note 15, at 110
("[T]he failure of civil rights law to provide for sexual equality may actually provide an
incentive for defendants in discrimination cases to concede 'heterosexist,' rather than
'racial,' bias when the surrounding circumstances of their cases strongly suggest the
operation of 'some' discriminatory motivation."); Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes,
and Toinboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex," "Gender," and "Sexual Orientation" in
Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1, 147 (1995) (arguing that "because
sexual orientation discrimination is generally permissible, an employer need only say that
it based its sex/gender discrimination on a 'suspicion' about sexual orientation to elude
legal repercussion").
83. See Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race, supra note 15, at 110.
84. No. 99-3150, 2000 WL 702126 (7th Cir. May 24, 2000).
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allergens.8 9 Peterson contended that the defendant's refusal to transfer
him constituted deliberate indifference to his medical needs, a violation
of the Eighth Amendment, and also amounted to invidious discrimina-
tion forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.0°
The prison officials justified their refusal to move Peterson to the
open dormitory in sexually-charged terms:
They insisted that the transfer was not appropriate because
Peterson had previously lived in E-Dormitory [an open
dormitory], but proved unsuitable for dormitory living be-
cause of his open and aggressive homosexual behavior. Prison
officials noted that women's clothes were confiscated from
Peterson when he was living in E-dormitory. During that
time, confidential informants complained to prison staff
about Peterson's late-night sexual activities and the fear of
sexually transmitted diseases. 9'
The prison's argument clearly reaffirms heterosexist and patriarchal
ideology. The prison officials viewed Peterson as a security risk because
he is, in stereotypic rhetoric, an "open and aggressive homosexual
' 92
who once had "women's clothes" in his cell.93 The officials removed
Peterson from the open dormitory because he engaged in "late-night
sexual activities"; thus, Peterson, not the heterosexual or closeted homo-
sexual men with whom he had sexual relations, posed a threat of
"sexually transmitted diseases" 94 and unrest.
In addition to challenging the defendant's blatant homophobia, Pe-
terson also argued that he suffered from racial discrimination. Specifically,
Peterson alleged that prison officials allowed white gays to live in the
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. (emphasis added).
92. See, e.g., John Balzar, Why Does America Fear Gays?, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 4, 1993, at
Al (discussing the "gay as sexual predator" stereotype).
93. See also Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The
Disaggregation of Sex From Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 58-69 (1995) (arguing that the
legal suppression of "cross-dressing" and transgenderism reinscribes traditional gender
norms).
94. The prison officials' belief that Peterson may spread a sexually transmitted disease
is likely a product of "AIDS-phobia" and homophobia. See Laurence Zuckerman, Open
Season on Gays: AIDS Sparks An Epidemic of Violence Against Homosexuals, TIME, Mar. 7,
1988, at 24 (discussing a rise in anti-gay hate crimes due to irrational fears concerning the
AIDS epidemic). The court pointed to no evidence in the record concerning the spread
of disease in the prison. Peterson, 2000 WL 702126. If the prison officials were concerned




open dormitory and that these officials told him that black gays could not
be assimilated into the open dormitory environment.9
Despite the evidence of racial and sexual orientation discrimination
in the record, the court of appeals upheld the district court's award of
summary judgment to the defendant on both the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment claims.96 With respect to plaintiffs Equal Protection claim,
the court held that there was no evidence of racial discrimination in the
97
record. The court acknowledged that the prison officials denied any
racial animus but conceded discriminating on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion:
In the record before us, there is nothing to show that
prison officials had a racially discriminatory intent when
they refused to move Peterson to E-Dornitory. The de-
fendants submitted affidavits denying that the decision not
to transfer Peterson was racially motivated. The defendants
explained that they tried not to place any admitted homo-
sexuals in an open dormitory because it was disruptive to
the other prisoners. 98
The court's analysis improperly resolves competing, material factual
claims on a motion for summary judgment.99 Because Peterson presented
evidence that white gays, unlike black gays, were housed in the open
dormitory, the record was in dispute over the existence of racial dis-
crimination.' ° More significantly, however, the court's dismissal of
Peterson's allegations of racial discrimination rests entirely on the defen-
dant conceding its heterosexism. The defendant's admission to
discriminating against gay inmates precluded the court from finding that
the defendant also engaged in racial discrimination. In other words, the
defendant's homophobia erected a barrier to a finding of racism; the
95. Peterson, 2000 WL 702126, at *1.
96. The court upheld summary judgment on the Eighth Amendment claim on the
grounds that the plaintiff's respiratory problems were not severe enough to mandate
extraordinary attention by the prison and that the prison had tried to accommodate the
plaintiff's condition by moving him to a cell near an open door and providing him
medical treatment. Id. at *2.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment "shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admis-
sions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
100. Often, discrimination cases will present questions of fact regarding the defen-
dant's intent or motive, thereby precluding summary judgment. See CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2732.2, 349-50 (2d ed.
1983).
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court treated racism and heterosexism as conflicting phenomena that
exist in completely separate spheres. The court thus deploys the same
essentialist equality framework that imagines the various identity catego-
ries and systems of subordination as unconnected and oppositional. This
essentialist model denies civil rights protection to members of oppressed
social groups who suffer from multiple forms of exclusion.1 '
In the context of race and sexuality discrimination claims, the un-
protected status of sexual orientation in civil rights jurisprudence, along
with judicial essentialism, actually provides an incentive for defendants to
concede homophobic intent as a way of masking and obscuring racism. 1
2
In Peterson, for example, the court held that the defendant's admission of
heterosexist discrimination does not advance plaintiff's claim because
sexual orientation discrimination receives a lower level of scrutiny than
racial discrimination in equal protection cases:
The defendants did admit that their decision not to transfer
Peterson to E-Dormitory was based on his sexual orienta-
tion, but this decision is subject only to rational basis
review because homosexuals are neither a suspect nor
quasi-suspect class. Under this standard, defendants need
only show that their decision was rationally related to a le-
gitimate government interest. We agree with the
defendants that their decision not to transfer Peterson was
rationally related to their legitimate interest in reducing
openly sexual behavior in the prison. Peterson's previous
open and aggressive sexual behavior demonstrated to de-
fendants that he was not a suitable candidate for open
dormitory living.
0 3
The court, therefore, legitimizes the defendant's sexual orientation
discrimination and allows the defendant to disprove evidence of racial
discrimination by openly embracing heterosexism. Thus, homophobia
reinforces racial subjugation. The essentialist nature of equality jurispru-
dence and the unprotected status of sexual orientation in civil rights law
permit such a harmful result. Because the court does not understand
discrimination as a multidimensional entity, its decision can recognize
only racial discrimination or sexual orientation discrimination, but not
101. See Williamson v. A.G. Edwards and Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1989)
(awarding summary judgment to the defendant in an employment discrimination case
brought by a black gay male on the grounds that the plaintiffs discharge centered more
on his sexuality, not his race, and because federal civil rights statutes do not prohibit
sexual orientation discrimination).
102. See sources cited supra note 82.
103. Peterson, 2000 WL 702126 at *2.
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both.' 4 Furthermore, the deferential judicial review of sexual orientation
discrimination will likely encourage defendants in race-sexuality cases,
where some evidence of discrimination exists, to admit their heterosex-
ism and succeed under a rationality review, while racial hierarchy is
masked, hidden, and deemed disproved. 10
Although equality theory and jurisprudence utilize a narrow and
essentialist theory of equality and justice, several scholars have presented
alternative models that do not fragment individual identity or place sys-
tems of subordination and progressive theorists in conflict. The next
section of this Article discusses the historical evolution of this work and
examines the conceptual and substantive differences among scholars in
this area who, collectively, are attempting to construct an adequate the-
ory of subordination.
Il1. "INTERSECTIONALITY," "MULTIDIMENSIONALITY" AND BEYOND
A. The Intersectionality Model
Feminist theorists have developed the most influential and extensive
scholarly responses to the problems of essentialism in equality theory and
jurisprudence. These scholars have criticized antiracist analysis, feminist
theory, and equality jurisprudence for failing to recognize the
"intersection" of race and sex discrimination and the impact of this in-
tersectional discrimination upon women of color.0 6 Kimberl& Williams
Crenshaw, a leading intersectionality theorist, wishes to "disrupt the
tendencies to see race and gender as exclusive or separable categories,"
but she views intersectionality as a "transitional concept" that "can be
replaced as our understanding of each category becomes more multidimen-
sional." °
0 7
104. Cf Crenshaw, supra note 73, at 142-43 (criticizing judicial failure to recognize
the multidimensionality of black women's experiences).
105. See sources cited supra note 82.
106. For a list of relevant literature, see Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen, supra note 14, at
562 n.9.
107. Kimberlk Williams Crenshaw, Beyond Racism and Misogyny: Black Feminism and 2
Live Crew, in WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 111, 114 (Mari J. Matsuda et al. eds., 1993) (emphasis added).
Several other scholars share Crenshaw's vision. See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism
in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. R-v. 581, 615 (criticizing feminist essentialism and
arguing that feminists must "root out and examine [their] differences"); Mari J. Matsuda,
Beside My Sister, Facing the Enemy: Legal Theory Out of Coalition, 43 STAN. L. Rav. 1183,
1189 (1991) (arguing that "[w]orking in coalition forces us to look for both the obvious
and non-obvious relationships of domination, helping us to realize that no form of subor-
dination ever stands alone").
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The intersectionality critique has brought several compelling in-
sights to bear upon legal theory. First, intersectionality scholarship has
destabilized traditional attempts to treat oppressed classes as monolithic
groups. By exploring the interactions between racial oppression and
patriarchy, intersectionality theorists have persuasively demonstrated the
diverging social statuses among and between "women" and "persons of
color," differences caused by racial, gender, and class positionality. 08
Second, intersectionality theory provides a formidable challenge to
the notion that scholars can adequately examine or provide solutions to
one form of subordination without analyzing how it is affected and
shaped by other systems of domination. 1°9 Intersectionality theorists, for
example, have provided compelling accounts of the role that patriarchy
plays in the marginalization of persons of color; their work has demon-
strated that intersecting gender and racial domination affect women of
color in areas as diverse as domestic violence, 110 sexual assault, 11 repro-
ductive control,"' and criminal law.113 Their analyses counsel against
developing policies to combat gender and racial hierarchy without first
examining how these forms of oppression interact.
Third, interesectionality theory has illustrated that the failure to ex-
amine the problem of intersecting subordination produces an equality
theory that centers around the lives of relatively privileged individuals.
The absence of an analysis of racial subjugation in feminist theory, for
example, means that feminism will reflect the experiences and needs of
white women-who do not suffer directly from racial oppression; like-
wise, when antiracists refuse to challenge gender hierarchy, they
construct an equality theory that centers around men-who are not the
immediate victims of sexism."'
Finally, intersectionality considers the intersection of forms of sub-
ordination-rather than intersecting privilege and subordination-as an
extremely important site of analysis; accordingly, white women and men
108. See generally Harris, supra note 107.
109. See Matsuda, supra note 15, at 1189 ("As we look at these patterns of oppression,
we may come to learn, finally and most importantly, that all forms of subordination are
interlocking and mutually reinforcing.").
110. See Linda L. Ammons, Mules, Madonnas, Babies, Bathwater, Racial Imagery and
Stereotypes: The African American Woman and the Battered Woman Syndrome, 1995 Wis. L.
REV. 1003, 1017-30 (1995).
111. See, e.g., Jennifer Wriggins, Note, Rape, Racism, and the Law, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S
L.J. 103 (1983).
112. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of
Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419 (1991).
113. See id.
114. See Crenshaw, supra note 73, at 151 (arguing that the "paradigm of sex discrimii-
nation tends to be based on the experiences of white women [and that] the model of race
discrimination tends to be based on the experiences of the most privileged Blacks").
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of color are not frequent subjects in intersectionality scholarship. Instead,
women of color (and others who suffer from "multiple" forms of domi-
nation) figure prominently in the intersectionality literature." ' This final
aspect of intersectionality responded to the virtual absence of any juridi-
cal and theoretical recognition of the particular hardships that women of
color endure as victims of subordination."6 Thus, intersectionality schol-
arship enriched legal theory by filling this glaring, jurisprudential
vacuum.
B. "Multidimensionality" and Other Extensions of Intersectionality
The intersectionality scholarship has inspired helpful analyses in ar-
eas outside of the contexts of feminism and antiracism. Lesbian feminists,
gays and lesbians of color, and other scholars have utilized the intersec-
tional model in order to counter essentialism in feminism, law and
sexuality, critical race theory, and poverty studies." ' These scholars, like
the intersectionality theorists, have also examined the experiences of
persons who suffer from intersecting forms of marginalization and have
proposed policies to address the reality of complex subordination. "8
Although heavily influenced by intersectional analysis, the "post-
intersectionality" theorists have offered several improvements to the
intersectionality model. In particular, race-sexuality critics, whose work
examines the relationships among racism, patriarchy, class domination,
and heterosexism, are currently developing a sizeable body of scholarship
that extends intersectionality theory into new substantive and conceptual
terrains.
In a series of articles, I have examined the relationships among ra-
cism, heterosexism, patriarchy, and class oppression utilizing a model I
refer to as "multidimensionality." Multidimensionality "recognize[s] the
inherent complexity of systems of oppression ... and the social identity
categories around which social power and disempowerment are distrib-
uted.""19 Multidimensionality posits that the various forms of identity and
oppression are "inextricably and forever intertwined"' 20 and that essen-
tialist equality theories "invariably reflect the experiences of class- and
115. See id. at 167 (urging legal theorists to place women of color at the center of their
analyses).
116. See Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race, supra note 15, at 14.
117. See Hutchinson, Beyond the Rhetoric, supra note 21, at 185-88.
118. Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race, supra note 15, at 14.
119. Id. at 9.
120. Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen, supra note 14, at 641.
Identity Crisis
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
race-privileged" individuals. 21 Multidimensionality, therefore, arises out
of and is informed by intersectionality theory.1
The writings of other race-sexuality scholars make similar observa-
tions. Francisco Valdes, a leading race-sexuality theorist, has embraced
explicitly a multidimensional antisubordination theory. Valdes envisions
"multidimensionality" as a tool to:
remind[] all outgroups that all forms of identity hierarchy
impinge on the social and legal interests of their members:
biases based on race/ethnicity, sex/gender, sexual orienta-
tion and other identity features are directly relevant to each
of those overlapping groups' social and legal interests be-
cause all of those biases impact members of every such
group. Multidimensionality tends to promote awareness of
patterns as well as particularities in social relations by
studying in an interconnected way the specifics of subordina-
tion.1
23
Valdes' nuanced analyses help illuminate the "interconnectivity'
124
of subordination and the need to develop more complex, rather than
essentialist, responses to oppression.
Similarly, Elvia Arriola has examined the operation of gender, race,
sexuality, and class hierarchies in the lives of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender individuals. 2 ' Arriola's scholarship "rejects the idea of arbi-
trarily separating out categories to address discrimination in our society.
Instead, [Arriola] understands discrimination as a problem that arises
when multiple traits and stereotypes constructed around them converge
in a specific harmful act., 126 Arriola urges legal scholars to engage in a
"holistic" examination of the contours and effects of subordination.
Finally, Peter Kwan analyzes the synergistic relationship between
identity categories using a framework he calls "co-synthesis."' 2 8 Kwan's
121. Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race, supra note 15, at 10.
122. See id.
123. Francisco Valdes, Beyond Sexual Orientation in Queer Legal Theory: Majoritarianism,
Multidimensionality, and Responsibility in Social Justice Scholarship or Legal Scholars as Cultural
Warriors, 75 DENV. U. L. REv. 1409, 1415 (1998) (emphasis added).
124. Francisco Valdes, Sex and Race in Queer Legal Culture: Ruminations on Identities and
Inter-Connectivities, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 25 (1995).
125. Elvia R. Arriola, Gendered Inequality: Lesbians, Gays, and Feminist Legal Theory, 9
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 103 (1994).
126. Id. at 141.
127. Id. at 139-41.




theory of co-synthesis argues that social identity categories are mutually
reinforcing and rely upon one another for meaning:
Cosynthesis insists that identity categories are sometimes
themselves constructed or synthesized out of and relies [sic]
upon other categorical notions. Therefore, this mutually
defining, synergistic, and complicit relationship between
identity categories is a dynamic model of multiple subordi-
nating gestures. It denies the priority of the deconstructive
concerns of class over race, of race over gender, or of gen-
der over sexual orientation, of anything over anything
else. 129
Kwan's analysis provides a complicated alternative to traditional es-
sentialist models.
Although the race-sexuality scholars borrow heavily from the inter-
sectionality literature, these theorists have offered compelling substantive
and conceptual extensions of intersectional analysis.1
3 0
1. Substantive Extension of Intersectionality
The most important substantive addition that multidimensionality
and other race-sexuality models bring to intersectionality scholarship is
the examination of heterosexist subordination (alongside race, gender,
and class), a topic that is omitted from much of the intersectionality
literature.' The inclusion of sexual identity within multidimensional
analysis permits scholars to examine the complexity of subordination in
the gay and lesbian context and provides a richer, fuller portrait of the
particularity of experience.
2. Conceptual Extensions of Intersectionality
The race-sexuality theorists have also offered several conceptual re-
formulations of intersectionality. These scholars, for example, have
examined the "intersections" of privilege and subordination, while in-
tersectionality usually focuses primarily upon the reality of intersecting
129. Id. at 688.
130. Much of the ensuing analysis reflects theories developed in my own scholarship.
Nevertheless, as noted, other race-sexuality scholars have begun to move their work in
similar directions.
131. See Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race, supra note 15, at 11-12; Valdes,
supra note 123, at 1421.
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subordination. 132 Accordingly, my scholarship treats complex subordina-
tion as a "universal phenomenon," rather than a problem limited to
classes of persons currently excluded from equality discourse. As a
result, multidimensionality offers a compelling response to essentialist
scholars who reject intersectional analyses on the ground that such work
is relevant only to those individuals who endure multiple forms of domi-
nation. By examining the intersecting privilege and subordination that
serve as the foundation for essentialist analysis in critical race theory,
feminism, and in law and sexuality scholarship, multidimensionality
unveils the discrimination that results when proponents of essentialism
continue to exclude current outsiders (e.g., gay, lesbian, bisexual, and
transgender persons of color) from equality theory on the ground that
these groups are burdened by tertiary concerns. The essentialist theories
are firmly grounded upon complexity-the multidimensional experi-
ences of individuals who, though subordinate, enjoy social privilege (e.g.,
heterosexual, upper-class, white women).34
Multidimensionality also complicates the very notions of privilege
and subordination. For instance, by focusing on intersecting "privileged"
and "subordinate" categories, my scholarship has uncovered the hetero-
sexual stereotypes that inform the "sexualized racism" endured by all
people of color.' 35 Lynching, for example, was frequently "justified"
through a racist, sexualized rhetoric that constructed black males as het-
erosexual threats to white women.136 Thus, heterosexual status, typically a
privileged category, has served as a source of racial subjugation.3 7 This
history complicates the apparent stability of privileged and subordinate
categories; the meanings of these identity categories are, instead, con-
textual and shifting.' 8
A multidimensional analysis also problematizes the notion of inter-
secting subordination, the primary focus of intersectionality scholarship.
Intersectionality, for example, typically considers women of color subor-
dinate relative to men of color and white women. The inclusion of
sexuality hierarchies in a multidimensional analysis destabilizes this
framework. Heterosexist domination privileges heterosexual women of
132. See, e.g., Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race, supra note 15, at 12-17
(distinguishing multidimensionality from intersectionality); Valdes, supra note 123, at
1424-25 (analyzing intersecting whiteness, maleness, and queer status).
133. Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race, supra note 15, at 12-17.
134. See id.
135. See Hutchinson, Gay Rights for Gay Whites, supra note 24, at 1366.
136. Id.
137. See id. at 1366-67; Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race, supra note 15, at
79-96.
138. In a recent article, I examine how anti-gay theorists invoke the "whiteness"-
indisputably a privileged category-of gays and lesbians to legitimate heterosexist dis-
crimination and subordination. See Hutchinson, Gay Rights for Gay Whites, supra note 24.
[VOL. 6:285
SPRING 2001]
color (the quintessential subjects of intersectionality) and disadvantages
lesbians of color; heterosexism also marginalizes gay men of color and
advantages heterosexual men of color.13 9 Multidimensionality, therefore,
permits a more nuanced examination of the operation of privilege and
subordination among oppressed social groups.
C. Suggestions for Future Theorizing
While the race-sexuality scholarship offers both conceptual and
substantive improvements over intersectionality, the work in this area
must undergo further development. One of the most important unre-
solved issues in equality scholarship and jurisprudence is the unprotected
status of sexual identity. Intersectional analyses, however, have examined
two categories-race and sex-that already receive "some" protection in
civil rights jurisprudence.14 ° Because the race-sexuality theorists direct
their attention to heterosexism, as well as race, class, and gender, these
scholars must construct creative responses to subordination that ulti-
mately seek to achieve different goals from intersectionality scholars:
race-sexuality theorists need to persuade courts and legislatures that het-
erosexism warrants a civil rights remedy.1 4' The precarious status of
sexual orientation in civil rights jurisprudence actually encourages dis-
criminating defendants to concede heterosexism in civil rights cases.'
4 2
In cases of mixed racial, gender and sexual orientation discrimination,
the concession of heterosexism allows for the masking of racial and
gender animus. 143 Multidimensionality can facilitate the important goal
of securing civil rights protection for gays and lesbians and for unveil-
ing the mutually reinforcing relationship between racism, patriarchy,
and heterosexism.
139. See id. at 1367.
140. I do not wish to imply that civil rights jurisprudence combats the most pervasive
forms of racial inequality and patriarchy.
141. See Francisco Valdes, Queer Margins, Queer Ethics: A Call to Account for Race and
Ethnicity in the Law, Theory, and Politics of "Sexual Orientation," 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1293,
1335 (1997) ("The doctrinal experience with race and gender suggests that intersection-
ality is not well suited to sexual orientation equality claims because 'sexual orientation
discrimination' is not formally prohibited by federal anti-discrimination statutes."). Pov-
erty is also an unprotected status in civil rights law. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 25-28 (1973); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 142 (1971).
Multidimensional theorists should also join efforts to reshape this jurisprudence.
142. See supra notes 102-105 and accompanying text.
143. See id.
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1. Multidimensionality and the False Notion of Gay, Lesbian,
Bisexual, and Transgender Privilege
The pervasive and pernicious "white and wealthy" gay stereotype
stands as a tremendous obstacle to gay and lesbian equality. Activists,
theorists, and jurists contest the validity of gay and lesbian equality by
portraying sexual minorities as a privileged class who, unlike persons of
color, do not need the protection of civil rights law.1 4 A de-essentialized
and multidimensional equality theory can destabilize this harmful con-
struct. Multidimensionality challenges the limited legal imagination that
constructs gays and lesbians as a class of white individuals; anti-
essentialism demands that the voices of the poor and persons of color
have an audience in pro-gay equality discourse. Accordingly, multidi-
mensionality can help counter the factual premise of the wealthy gay
stereotype and can strengthen equality theory by making it responsive to
the diverse needs of gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and transgender people. 14
Multidimensionality also examines the class effects of homophobia
in order to demonstrate that, contrary to popular, misleading surveys,
heterosexism imposes an economic detriment upon its victims. Thus, as a
growing body of research demonstrates, gays and lesbians are disadvan-
taged in the competition for social resources. 146 Furthermore, many
efforts to measure the wealth of gays and lesbians have failed because they
do not take into account the racial and class dynamics of the closet. An
individual's ability to express publicly a marginalized sexual orientation,
however, correlates with wealth and whiteness; thus, by studying the
income and educational attainment of "out" gays and lesbians, many gay
and lesbian income surveys skew the racial and class composition of the
gay and lesbian community.1 47 Multidimensionality can help destabilize
144. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
145. See Hutchinson, Gay Rights for Gay Whites, supra note 24, at 1383-85.
146. See M.V. Lee Badgett, Beyond Biased Samples: Challenging the Myths on the Eco-
notnic Status of Lesbians and Gay Men, in HoMo ECONOMICS: CAPITALISM, COMMUNITY
AND LESBIAN AND GAY LIFE 65, 69-70 (Amy Gluckman & Betsy Reed eds., 1997).
147. VAID, supra note 36, at 256 (arguing that "middle-class and wealthy gay people
are far more likely to be visible than are working-class and poor queers"); Hutchinson,
Out Yet Unseen, supra note 14, at 608 (arguing that gays and lesbians of color often do not
reveal their sexual orientation "because they fear the 'horrible risk ... [of] further disen-
franchise [ment].'" (alterations in original) (citation omitted)); Samuel A. Marcosson, The
"Special Rights" Canard in the Debate Over Lesbian and Gay Civil Rights, 9 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 137, 160 n.69 (1995) (arguing that gays and lesbians who
respond to gay and lesbian income surveys "are those who are in a position of relative
comfort and security, and not those in a position of relative economic insecurity, for




these misleading gay wealth surveys by unveiling their flawed racial and
class assumptions.
2. Multidimensionality and the Problem of Comparative
Equal Protection Analysis
Multidimensionality can also encourage courts and theorists to find
alternatives to the rigidly comparative analysis currently used in equal
protection discourse. Under traditional equal protection analysis, a group
of individuals seeking heightened judicial solicitude must show how they
are "like" other protected classes.148 For gays and lesbians, meeting this
standard has proved impossible. Courts invariably have found that gays
and lesbians, unlike persons of color and women, do not experience
discrimination on the basis of some "immutable" trait and do not lack
political power.19
The logic of the comparative approach disintegrates under the mi-
croscope of multidimensional analysis. A rigidly comparative equal
protection jurisprudence incorrectly treats gays and lesbians, persons of
color, and women as separate classes. Courts then racialize gays and lesbi-
ans as white and powerful and deny them judicial solicitude.
Multidimensionality problematizes this inaccurate portrait of gay privi-
lege and offers a more honest and diverse depiction of gay, lesbian,
bisexual, and transgender communities.5 °
3. Multidimensionality and the "Separate Spheres"
Analysis of Racism and Heterosexism
Finally, multidimensionality provides a response to the judicial
treatment of racism and heterosexism as unrelated phenomena. Although
equality jurisprudence provides a remedy for some forms of racial subju-
gation, courts and lawmakers routinely exclude gays and lesbians from
civil rights protection. By settling on a differing legal status for racial and
sexual orientation discrimination, courts imply that the two forms of
oppression exist in completely separate spheres and that the law can undo
racism while leaving sexuality hierarchies untouched. Multidimensional-
ity counsels against such an approach.
Multidimensionality uncovers the untold stories of gay, lesbian, bi-
sexual, and transgendered persons who are poor and of color; their lives
undermine the notion that systems of subordination resist convergence.
148. See supra notes 60-72 and accompanying text.
149. See id.
150. For a more extensive treatment of this issue, see Hutchinson, Gay Rights for Gay
Whites, supra note 24, at 1378-82, 1385-86.
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The absence of an accurate racial and class analysis in gay rights jurispru-
dence, by contrast, allows courts and lawmakers to deny civil rights
protection to all gays and lesbians.' Similarly, when antiracists dismiss
the importance of combating heterosexism, they allow acts of racist-
homophobia to remain unchallenged. 5 2 Furthermore, in the context of
antidiscrimination litigation, courts may point to the mere presence of
heterosexist bias as evidence that defendants did not act out of racial
animus. Under this essentialist, "either/or" formulation, a finding of
anti-gay discrimination negates discussion of racial animus. Courts may
then reject plaintiffs' claims on the ground that sexual orientation dis-
crimination is not proscribed by civil rights jurisprudence."13 Under a
"separate spheres" treatment of race and sexuality, both heterosexism and
racism are clearly mutually reinforcing and immune from judicial invali-
dation. Heteronormative courts decline to apply heightened scrutiny to
claims of anti-gay discrimination and then point to the existence of het-
erosexism as disproving the operation of racism. Hence, these courts fail
to remedy either racial or sexual identity discrimination; both forms of
discrimination are insulated from relief under an essentialist equality
framework.' 4
Multidimensionality responds to this perverse jurisprudence. Multi-
dimensionality argues for the inclusion of sexual identity within civil
rights jurisprudence and theory not because gays and lesbians are "like"
persons of color but because racism and sexuality hierarchies sustain one
another.'55 Under a multidimensional approach, a progressive sexual
politics becomes critical to the advancement of persons of color because
heterosexism contributes to the subordinate status of racially oppressed
communities.5 6 Multidimensionality can, therefore, serve as an important
tool in the development of an adequate response to subordination.
151. See id. at 1385 (arguing that the "prominence of social advantage within gay and
lesbian equality discourse lends credibility to an inaccurate, racialized, anti-gay discourse
that would deny equality to all sexually transgressive individuals") (emphasis in original).
152. See Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race, supra note 15, at 98 ("By
ignoring how the sexualization of race subordinates gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgen-
dered people of color, anti-racist activists and theorists permit an entire category of racial
oppression-homophobic racial subordination-to escape their needed analysis and cri-
tique.").
153. See supra notes 73-104 and accompanying text.
154. Id.
155. See Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen, supra note 14, at 633-34 (arguing for protection
of sexual identity by demonstrating its relationship to racial identity).
156. See Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race, supra note 15, at 20-40




This Symposium has provided needed space for scholars to examine
important issues in equality theory and jurisprudence. Among the most
compelling concerns facing contemporary scholars is the raging conflict
over identity caused by essentialist equality theories and activism. Essen-
tialism falsely constructs progressive communities as competitors, rather
than as potential allies; essentialism also requires individuals to discard
important aspects of their identity in order to embrace a narrow, inade-
quate conceptualization of equality.
A powerful intellectual movement, however, offers insightful
analyses that can redirect equality theory and jurisprudence away from
the failed essentialism experiment. Intersectionality theory, for example,
has provided jurists, scholars, and activists with persuasive arguments
regarding the need to construct more complex antisubordination theo-
ries. More recently, race-sexuality scholars have expanded the
intersectionality literature with substantive and conceptual improve-
ments. Together, these scholars are building an alternative liberation
discourse that can serve as the foundation for the articulation of more
comprehensive and effective theories of equality.
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